When we talk about fairness in development, one question always surfaces: should everyone get an equal share of the pie, or should those who contribute more receive a bigger slice? This is the heart of the principle of desert, a foundational idea in distributive justice that insists benefits and rewards should match what people actually earn through their skills, effort, and contributions. It shapes how governments design salaries, promotions, welfare schemes, and even how competitive exams like the UPSC select officers. Let us unpack this principle, its intellectual roots, its supporters, its critics, and its relevance to decentralised development today.
Table of Contents
- What the principle of desert really means
- The intellectual foundations: Smith, Spencer, and the classical view
- Adam Smith and the moral grounding of merit
- Herbert Spencer and the individualist reading
- Locke’s labour theory as a supporting pillar
- Why desert matters for development
- The incentive argument
- The competence argument
- The principle of desert in decentralised governance
- Meritocratic recruitment and grassroots governance
- The egalitarian critique: when desert runs into luck
- The problem of moral arbitrariness
- The institutional objection
- Defenders strike back
- Applying desert thoughtfully in development policy
What the principle of desert really means
At its simplest, desert says that justice is about giving people what they deserve. If you work harder, contribute more, or bring rare skills to the table, you are entitled to a proportionally greater reward. If someone contributes less, they receive less. The principle is deeply tied to the idea of merit, which is why it often sits at the core of meritocratic systems.
The word itself has interesting roots. The English word “desert” in this philosophical sense comes from the Old French deserte, meaning merit or recompense, and is the source of the phrase “just deserts”. In moral philosophy, to deserve something means to earn a reward or penalty that is morally relevant to one’s actions.
The ancient Greeks laid the groundwork for this thinking. Aristotle argued in the Nicomachean Ethics that distributive justice involves judging people according to certain criteria to determine whether they are equal or unequal; equals should receive equal shares, and unequals should receive unequal shares in proportion to their merit. Plato, similarly, suggested that justice involves treating people as they deserve to be treated.
The intellectual foundations: Smith, Spencer, and the classical view
The principle of desert was not invented in a vacuum. It draws from a long intellectual tradition that links moral philosophy with economics.
Adam Smith and the moral grounding of merit
Adam Smith devoted an entire section of The Theory of Moral Sentiments to the sense of merit and demerit, treating them as distinct qualities of human action that invite either reward or punishment. For Smith, merit was not just an economic concept but a moral one rooted in human sentiment. Actions that produce beneficial effects deserve gratitude and reward; actions that produce harm deserve resentment and punishment.
This thinking runs through modern economics too. A long tradition in economics going back to Adam Smith has argued that people give primacy to merit rather than luck in distributive choices, accepting inequality far more readily when they believe it reflects earned differences rather than arbitrary fortune.
Herbert Spencer and the individualist reading
Herbert Spencer took Smith’s ideas in a more individualist direction. Spencer, who championed a “night watchman” theory of the state, argued that individuals should reap the full consequences of their own conduct, good or bad. If you were capable and hardworking, you would flourish. If you were not, the state should not step in to smooth things over. His version of desert became a cornerstone of laissez-faire thinking, where the market itself was trusted to reward merit fairly.
Locke’s labour theory as a supporting pillar
John Locke added another influential strand. Locke argued that people deserve the items produced by their toil and industry, with the products or their value being a fitting reward for effort. This idea, that the fruits of your labour should belong to you, is the bedrock of most modern desert-based claims, whether in wages, property rights, or professional recognition.
Why desert matters for development
When development economists and administrators talk about equal distribution of benefits, the principle of desert surfaces as a counterweight to pure egalitarianism. It asks a practical question: if everyone receives the same regardless of contribution, what motivates people to innovate, work hard, or take risks?
The incentive argument
Proponents like George Harris and Alan Goldman argue that rewarding merit creates powerful incentives. When people know their effort, skill, and capacity will be recognised proportionally, they invest more in developing themselves. An entrepreneur takes a chance on a new venture, a researcher pursues a difficult problem, a civil servant goes beyond the minimum required. Contemporary desert theorists argue that people freely apply their abilities and talents in varying degrees to socially productive work, coming to deserve varying levels of income by providing goods and services desired by others.
This is why most modern desert-based principles fall into recognisable categories: contribution (rewarded for the value added to the social product), effort (rewarded for the work put in), and compensation (rewarded for the costs or risks incurred).
The competence argument
Desert also supports the idea that the most competent individuals should hold positions of responsibility. In a hospital, you want the most skilled surgeon operating on you. In a government department implementing rural employment schemes, you want the officer with the sharpest grasp of delivery mechanisms. A meritocratic logic says that positions and rewards should match ability and contribution, not lineage, political connection, or arbitrary chance.
A meritocracy, in this sense, is a social system where advancement, reward, and status are based on individual abilities and talents. Those who are more capable advance further and reap greater rewards. The Indian civil services examination is often cited as a large-scale application of this logic.
The principle of desert in decentralised governance
Decentralised development makes the principle of desert even more interesting because it pushes decision-making closer to the people. When panchayats and municipalities handle their own schemes, the question of who deserves what becomes a daily practical matter.
Consider how a Gram Panchayat decides who gets preference in a skill development programme, or who is appointed to a local committee. A pure equality logic would rotate benefits uniformly. A desert-based logic would weigh who has shown initiative, who has completed prior training, who has contributed to village work. Both pull in different directions, and local bodies constantly negotiate between them.
Modern reform conversations in bureaucracy emphasise merit-based promotions, digital transformation, decentralisation, and ethical governance as intertwined goals. The thinking is that unless local administrative roles are filled on merit, decentralisation simply transfers inefficiency from the centre to the periphery.
Meritocratic recruitment and grassroots governance
The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments devolved substantial functional responsibilities to local bodies. But for these institutions to deliver, they need officials and elected representatives who can plan budgets, implement schemes, and manage conflicts. A desert-based approach would push for transparent selection criteria, performance-linked recognition, and career paths that reward demonstrated capacity.
This ties into a broader point. Meritocracy and constitutional morality are considered strong foundations of the civil services, and decentralised development can only succeed when these values percolate to the local level.
The egalitarian critique: when desert runs into luck
The principle of desert has powerful critics, and their arguments deserve serious attention. The most famous challenge comes from the philosopher John Rawls, whose work reshaped modern political philosophy.
The problem of moral arbitrariness
Rawls argued that the initial distribution of assets for any period of time is strongly influenced by natural and social contingencies, including intelligence, talents, and socioeconomic status. These are, in his famous phrase, “arbitrary from a moral point of view”. You did not earn the parents who raised you, the genetic lottery that gave you certain aptitudes, or the neighbourhood that shaped your early learning.
If so much of what we call “merit” is actually traceable to luck, can we really say someone deserves the rewards that flow from it? A brilliant mathematician did not deserve to be born with mathematical intuition. A strong athlete did not deserve their physiology. The egalitarian argument is that desert-based distributions end up rewarding luck under the label of merit.
The institutional objection
A related argument, advanced by thinkers like Samuel Scheffler, goes further. On this view, claims of desert are always dependent on a prior conception of justice and on expectations established by just institutions, meaning there is no independent principle of desert that can itself design fair institutions. What counts as “meritorious” is already shaped by the rules of the game, which raises the question of who gets to set those rules.
Defenders strike back
Defenders of desert have not surrendered. Critics of Rawls argue that demanding the basis of desert itself be deserved leads to an infinite regress, since no human being can ultimately claim to have deserved their own existence. If we reject every claim grounded in something the person did not originally deserve, we end up unable to speak about justice at all, not even about equality.
The honest position is probably somewhere in the middle. Pure desert ignores the role of structural disadvantage. Pure egalitarianism ignores the role of genuine effort and contribution. Real-world policy almost always blends the two.
Applying desert thoughtfully in development policy
So how should decentralised development engage with this principle? A few practical takeaways emerge.
First, desert is valuable as an incentive mechanism. Performance-linked incentives for teachers, healthcare workers, and panchayat officials can improve service delivery when designed well. Second, desert is valuable as a recruitment principle. Competitive, transparent selection for public roles helps keep governance capable. Third, desert must be tempered by an acknowledgement that opportunities are unequally distributed. Affirmative action, targeted scholarships, and capability-building programmes exist precisely because not everyone starts from the same line.
In practice, Indian policy has tried to hold these in tension. Reservations acknowledge structural disadvantage; competitive examinations acknowledge merit; welfare schemes acknowledge need. The principle of desert is one voice in this chorus, not the only one.
What do you think? If a hardworking farmer and a less engaged neighbour both receive the same benefits under a government scheme, does that feel fair to you, or does it undermine the incentive to contribute? And when talent itself is shaped by circumstances beyond our control, how much weight should desert actually carry in the design of public policy?
References
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Desert_(philosophy)
- https://iep.utm.edu/desert/
- https://www.adamsmithworks.org/documents/part-ii-of-merit-and-demerit-or-of-the-objects-of-reward-and-punishment
- https://academic.oup.com/ej/article-abstract/133/651/951/6835412
- https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1005937623890
- https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive/
- https://www.ispp.org.in/reforms-for-the-indian-bureaucracy-in-the-21st-century/
- https://www.iipa.org.in/publication/public/uploads/article/30861708578086.pdf
- https://scholars.bentley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1032&context=philosophy_facpubs
- https://as.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu-as/philosophy/documents/faculty-documents/scheffler/accessible/Scheffler_Justice-Desert.pdf
Leave a Reply