Distribution of Powers and Functions in Panchayat Raj Institutions

The idea of grassroots democracy in rural areas rests on a simple principle: decisions that affect villages should be taken by the people who live in them. Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRIs) were designed to make this principle real. Yet, the way powers and functions are distributed across the three tiers – the Gram Panchayat, Panchayat Samiti, and Zilla Parishad – has always been a contested space. States have often preferred to keep authority with themselves, committees have pushed for genuine devolution, and the 73rd Constitutional Amendment attempted to settle the debate by giving local bodies a permanent seat at the table. Understanding how powers are divided across these tiers helps make sense of why some Panchayats thrive while others remain dependent on the state government for almost everything.

Why intra-tier distribution matters 🔗

When we talk about intra-tier distribution of powers, we are asking a specific question: among the village, block, and district levels of Panchayati Raj, who gets to do what? The answer shapes everything – from the repair of a village pond to the preparation of a district-level development plan. If the Gram Panchayat has no real authority, villagers cannot respond to their own problems. If the Zilla Parishad is merely advisory, district-level planning becomes a paper exercise.

The historical record shows a consistent pattern: state governments have been reluctant to devolve substantial authority to any of the three tiers. Even when committees and constitutional provisions pushed in that direction, implementation has remained uneven. States have transferred some functions, retained others, and in many cases kept the purse strings firmly with themselves.

The colonial hangover 🔗

Part of this reluctance is inherited. India’s administrative structure was built around strong central and provincial authority during the colonial period, and post-independence governance continued many of those habits. Article 40 of the Constitution placed Panchayats in the Directive Principles, making them a goal rather than a binding requirement. For decades, the fate of local self-government depended on the political will of each state.

The Balwantrai Mehta Committee and the Panchayat Samiti 🔗

The first serious attempt to design a coherent system came from the Balwantrai Mehta Committee, appointed in January 1957 to examine the Community Development Programme and National Extension Service. Submitting its report in November 1957, the committee recommended a scheme of democratic decentralisation that came to be called Panchayati Raj.

The committee proposed a three-tier structure: Gram Panchayat at the village level, Panchayat Samiti at the block level, and Zilla Parishad at the district level. What made its design distinctive was the choice of the Panchayat Samiti as the focal point of the system. The block was seen as the unit where development programmes could be realistically planned and executed, close enough to villages to understand local needs but large enough to command technical and administrative resources.

A clear hierarchy of functions 🔗

In this design, the Panchayat Samiti was to be the executive body. The Zilla Parishad, sitting above it at the district level, was conceived as an advisory, coordinating, and supervisory body, with the District Collector as its chairman. The Gram Panchayat at the base would handle purely local matters, but the bulk of development activity – agricultural extension, primary education, health, rural industries – was meant to flow through the block.

The committee also insisted on a genuine transfer of power and responsibility to these bodies, along with adequate resources to carry out their functions. The National Development Council accepted these recommendations in 1958, and Rajasthan became the first state to inaugurate the system on 2 October 1959.

The state preference for a strong Zilla Parishad 🔗

In practice, states often departed from the Mehta blueprint. Several preferred to concentrate real authority at the Zilla Parishad level rather than at the Panchayat Samiti. This happened for a few reasons. The district already had an established administrative machinery under the Collector, making it convenient to graft the Zilla Parishad onto existing structures. State governments also found it easier to deal with one strong district body than with dozens of block-level samitis each asserting independent claims. The result was that, in many states, the Panchayat Samiti became a weak intermediate tier with functions on paper but limited autonomy in practice.

The Ashok Mehta Committee and real devolution 🔗

By the mid-1970s, the Panchayati Raj system was visibly declining. In December 1977, the Janata Government appointed the Ashok Mehta Committee to examine its problems. Submitting its report in August 1978 with 132 recommendations, the committee offered a fundamentally different design.

It proposed replacing the three-tier system with a two-tier structure consisting of the Zilla Parishad at the district level and the Mandal Panchayat below it, covering a cluster of villages with a population of roughly 15,000 to 20,000. The district, in this view, was the first viable point of decentralisation below the state because it commanded the technical expertise needed for rural development.

The Zilla Parishad as executive body 🔗

Crucially, the Ashok Mehta Committee argued for a genuine devolution of powers from the state government to the Zilla Parishad, not just on paper but in substance. The Zilla Parishad was to be the executive body, responsible for district-level planning and for a clearly defined set of developmental and regulatory functions. Development staff at the district would work under its control and supervision, and a Minister for Panchayati Raj would be appointed at the state level to safeguard the interests of local bodies.

Resources to match responsibilities 🔗

The committee recognised that devolution of functions without matching resources would leave Panchayats hollow. It therefore recommended compulsory powers of taxation for Panchayati Raj institutions so they could mobilise their own finances, along with regular social audits and the participation of political parties in Panchayat elections to bring accountability and political attention to the lowest rungs of governance.

The fall of the Janata Government prevented central implementation of these recommendations. However, Karnataka, West Bengal, and Andhra Pradesh adopted elements of the Ashok Mehta design in their own state legislation, producing some of the more robust Panchayati Raj experiments of the 1980s.

The 73rd Amendment and constitutional devolution 🔗

The long debate about distribution of powers reached a turning point with the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act of 1992, which inserted Part IX into the Constitution and gave Panchayats constitutional status. The amendment’s central purpose was to develop local institutions of self-government by emphasising the preparation and implementation of plans for economic development and social justice.

The Eleventh Schedule and its 29 subjects 🔗

The heart of the amendment’s approach to intra-tier distribution lies in Article 243G and the Eleventh Schedule, which lists 29 subjects that state legislatures may entrust to Panchayats. These cover areas such as agriculture, land improvement, minor irrigation, animal husbandry, rural housing, drinking water, roads, rural electrification, poverty alleviation programmes, education, health and sanitation, and the welfare of weaker sections.

Importantly, the Schedule does not itself allocate these subjects among the three tiers. That decision is left to each state legislature, which must decide how the 29 items are distributed across the Gram Panchayat, Panchayat Samiti, and Zilla Parishad. This design gave states flexibility but also allowed them to continue the old habit of incomplete devolution.

Uniform structure, uneven practice 🔗

Part IX mandated a three-tier structure at the village, intermediate, and district levels, with an exemption for states with populations below two million. It required regular five-year elections, reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and women, and the establishment of State Finance Commissions to recommend the sharing of financial resources between the state and Panchayats.

Yet in practice, states have not uniformly transferred the 29 subjects listed in the Eleventh Schedule. Some states have devolved most items in name while retaining the corresponding funds and functionaries – the famous “three Fs” problem of funds, functions, and functionaries. Others have created elaborate activity mapping exercises that assign specific sub-tasks of each subject to specific tiers, but even here, implementation often lags.

Gram Sabha as the foundation 🔗

One important innovation was the constitutional recognition of the Gram Sabha – the assembly of all registered voters in a village – as the foundation of the Panchayati Raj system. The Gram Sabha is not itself a tier but a permanent body whose powers and functions are determined by state legislation. It provides a direct-democracy check on elected Panchayats, giving villagers an opportunity to scrutinise plans and budgets before they are approved.

How functions are typically divided today 🔗

While the exact distribution varies by state, a broad pattern has emerged in most Indian states.

Gram Panchayat 🔗

The village-level body typically handles civic functions such as water supply, sanitation, street lighting, maintenance of village roads, management of village markets and fairs, birth and death registration, and the implementation of centrally sponsored schemes at the village level. It also convenes the Gram Sabha and prepares village-level development plans.

Panchayat Samiti 🔗

The block-level body generally coordinates development activities across villages, implements block-level schemes, runs primary health centres and schools where these are in its domain, supports agricultural extension, and acts as a link between the Gram Panchayats below and the Zilla Parishad above. Its role is often one of supervision and coordination rather than direct execution.

Zilla Parishad 🔗

The district-level body is usually responsible for district planning, major infrastructure projects, secondary education and higher health facilities, and the coordination of block-level bodies. In states that followed the Ashok Mehta direction, the Zilla Parishad has substantial planning and execution powers; in others, it remains a largely supervisory body with limited real authority.

Persistent challenges in distribution 🔗

Despite the constitutional framework, several challenges continue to shape intra-tier distribution. Inadequate devolution remains the most stubborn problem. Many states have devolved functions without transferring adequate funds or functionaries, leaving Panchayats responsible for tasks they cannot actually perform. Financial dependence on higher levels of government limits the autonomy of all three tiers. Parallel bodies – such as special-purpose agencies and district rural development agencies – often duplicate Panchayat functions, blurring lines of accountability.

The Ministry of Panchayati Raj’s annual Devolution Index tracks how far each state has gone in transferring functions, finances, and functionaries, and the results show wide variation. Kerala, Karnataka, and Maharashtra have historically performed well; several states in northern and eastern India lag considerably behind.

Looking at the bigger picture 🔗

The story of intra-tier distribution of powers in Panchayati Raj is, at its heart, a story about trust – whether the state is willing to trust its own villages, blocks, and districts with real authority over their affairs. The Balwantrai Mehta Committee trusted the block. The Ashok Mehta Committee trusted the district. The 73rd Amendment tried to lock in a permanent framework for all three tiers. Yet the final shape of distribution in each state continues to depend on political choices made in state capitals.

The constitutional architecture is now firmly in place, but turning it into meaningful self-government requires continuous push – from citizens, from elected representatives at all tiers, and from independent institutions like State Finance Commissions and the State Election Commissions. The promise of local self-government is only as strong as the powers actually placed in local hands.

What do you think? If you had to choose between the Balwantrai Mehta model with a strong Panchayat Samiti and the Ashok Mehta model with a powerful Zilla Parishad, which would serve rural India better today? And how far should a state go in devolving functions before the concern of administrative capacity at the village level becomes a genuine bottleneck?

References

1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balwantrai_Mehta_Committee
2. https://www.nextias.com/blog/evolution-of-panchayati-raj-institutions/
3. https://prepp.in/news/e-492-ashok-mehta-committee-indian-polity-notes
4. https://www.scribd.com/document/844375186/Ashok-Mehta-Committee
5. https://secforuts.mha.gov.in/73rd-amendment-of-panchayati-raj-in-india/
6. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panchayati_raj_in_India
7. https://www.gktoday.in/structure-and-major-functions-of-panchayati-raj-institutions-pris-in-india/