The 73rd Constitutional Amendment of 1992 was celebrated as a democratic revolution. It gave Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) constitutional status, mandated regular elections, reserved seats for women and marginalised groups, and promised to bring governance closer to the village. Three decades later, the picture is mixed. While the structure stands, the system is hobbled by tangled jurisdictions, shallow pockets, and a bureaucracy that still calls most of the shots. Understanding these weaknesses is essential for anyone studying public administration or thinking about how grassroots democracy actually works on the ground.

Table of Contents

The promise that never fully arrived

On paper, the new Panchayati Raj system is a marvel of democratic design. It created a uniform three-tier structure – Gram Panchayat at the village, Panchayat Samiti at the block, and Zila Parishad at the district – and listed 29 subjects in the Eleventh Schedule that could be devolved to these bodies. The amendment established more than 260,000 local bodies and over 3.1 million elected representatives, including roughly 1.4 million women, making it one of the largest experiments in participatory democracy anywhere in the world.

Yet scale has not translated neatly into substance. Representation has improved, but the authority to actually govern – to plan, to spend, to deliver – remains concentrated higher up. As one recent review notes, panchayats suffer from inadequate devolution of powers and limited autonomy due to the apathy of state governments and narrow judicial interpretations of panchayat legislation. The amendment created the skeleton; the flesh of real self-government is still being debated.

The coordination problem across the three tiers

The three-tier design was supposed to create a clean division of labour. The Gram Panchayat handles village-level services. The Panchayat Samiti coordinates development activities across blocks. The Zila Parishad plans at the district level. In reality, the boundaries are blurred.

Overlapping functions and unclear assignment

State Panchayati Raj Acts were supposed to spell out which tier does what. Most simply reproduced the Eleventh Schedule without breaking down responsibilities. As researchers have documented, few states have earmarked the functions of the Schedule as the exclusive jurisdiction of a particular tier, and powers have been assigned without keeping any cardinal principle in mind, resulting in overlapping of areas, functions and responsibilities across the different lines of PRIs. Agriculture, rural housing, health, education – these subjects often appear in the mandate of all three tiers with no clear map of who plans, who executes, and who audits.

The consequence is predictable. A Gram Panchayat may initiate a drinking water project only to find the Zila Parishad has already sanctioned something similar through a centrally sponsored scheme. Officials at the block level may treat village plans as suggestions rather than binding inputs. Coordination meetings happen, but without enforceable roles, the meetings often confirm duplication rather than resolve it.

The second coordination failure is between elected panchayat members and the local administrative machinery. Block Development Officers (BDOs), tehsildars, and line department officials were supposed to work under the direction of panchayat bodies. In practice, the relationship is often inverted. BDOs answer to their parent departments at the state level, not to the Sarpanch. State governments continue relying on the bureaucracy to deliver public goods and services rather than empowering the democratically elected community leaders, and outcomes are nowhere near commensurate with the goals.

The finance problem: responsibility without resources

A panchayat without money is a debating society. Financial weakness is arguably the single biggest reason the new system has underperformed.

Dependence on grants

Panchayats are supposed to raise some of their own revenue through local taxes, user fees, and property levies. Very few actually do. The vast majority of funds flowing into PRIs come from state and central grants, much of which is tied to specific purposes. The figures are striking: in Punjab, discussions with the 15th Finance Commission revealed that only 13 out of 29 functions from the Eleventh Schedule had been devolved to PRIs, and revenue for panchayats came primarily from state and central grants with negligible own tax revenue.

When money comes almost entirely from above, the incentive to be accountable to the people below weakens. Panchayats spend a great deal of energy chasing sanctions from state departments instead of raising resources locally and answering to the Gram Sabha.

The State Finance Commission shortfall

The 73rd Amendment inserted Article 243-I, requiring states to set up a State Finance Commission (SFC) every five years to recommend how state revenues should be shared with local bodies. This was meant to be the backbone of fiscal decentralisation. A 2025 Standing Committee report observed that despite the constitutional mandate, devolution of functions, funds and functionaries to PRIs remains incomplete, and many Panchayats operate with limited administrative authority, inadequate financial resources, and without effective planning control.

Worse, the SFCs themselves have been neglected. Out of 26 states for which information was provided to the Lok Sabha Standing Committee, only nine had constituted their 6th State Finance Commission by early 2023, and of those, only two were active. Delays in constituting SFCs cascade into delays in releasing funds, leaving panchayats in chronic fiscal limbo.

The tied-untied grant trap

Even the money that does arrive comes with heavy strings. Central Finance Commission grants to rural local bodies are split into tied and untied components. Tied grants can only be used for sanitation and drinking water supply, and if saturation in these categories has already been achieved through other schemes, the funds are not released to the panchayats because tied grants cannot be reallocated. A panchayat that has already solved its drinking water problem may be unable to use its own grant money for, say, a village school repair or a community hall. The local priority does not match the central formula, and the formula wins.

Bureaucratic resistance and political interference

Decentralisation was never going to be welcomed by those who stood to lose power through it. That includes both career bureaucrats and state-level politicians.

The bureaucracy as a rival centre

Line department officials have long treated panchayats as subordinate delivery vehicles rather than as governments in their own right. The culture of the Indian administrative state is vertical; information, approvals, and funds flow through hierarchies rooted in the state secretariat. When a Sarpanch tries to direct a local engineer or health worker, the officer often waits for orders from the district office. PRIs face challenges including incomplete transfer of functions, funds, and staff, delayed implementation of finance commission recommendations, bureaucratic control, and the need to navigate social power structures such as caste and gender politics.

MLAs, MPs, and the reluctance to share power

State-level politicians have their own reasons to keep panchayats weak. A strong, well-funded Zila Parishad chairperson is a potential rival to the local MLA. The major reason for the decline of Panchayati Raj has been the perception among the political leadership at the state level that PRIs represent a rival centre of power, and state governments have shown a lukewarm attitude towards their development, with widespread arbitrariness in superseding PRIs and elections being postponed on various pretexts. The constitutional requirement of regular elections has reduced – though not eliminated – this problem. Dissolving panchayats before their term is no longer easy, but delaying elections, stalling fund releases, and overloading panchayats with unfunded central schemes achieve much the same effect.

Capacity, awareness, and social barriers

Beyond the structural and financial issues lies a quieter weakness: the lack of capacity within panchayats themselves.

Training and technical support

Elected representatives often enter office with little preparation. They are expected to read budgets, understand scheme guidelines, oversee engineering works, and negotiate with officials – often in their first term. Training programmes exist but are patchy. Infrastructure gaps compound the problem: roughly 40,000 Gram Panchayats lack offices and about 55,000 lack computers, and many GPs do not have dedicated secretaries. Without basic administrative infrastructure, even committed representatives struggle to function as real governments.

Gram Sabha in name only

The Gram Sabha, the assembly of all adult voters in a village, is supposed to be the foundation of panchayati democracy – the forum where plans are approved and officials are held to account. In many places it meets rarely, attendance is thin, and decisions are ratified rather than debated. Without an active Gram Sabha, the Panchayat floats free of the community it is supposed to represent.

Caste, gender, and the problem of proxy representation

Reservations have brought women, Scheduled Castes, and Scheduled Tribes into panchayat halls in unprecedented numbers. The social reality inside those halls, however, has not always changed. The dominance of upper castes still hovers over the system and is a threat to the inclusive participation of deprived sections of society, while factors such as casteism, factionalism, and local rivalries impede the effectiveness of these institutions. Phenomena like “Sarpanch Pati” – where the husband of an elected woman Sarpanch runs the panchayat in practice – reveal the gap between formal representation and actual power.

Why these weaknesses matter

It would be easy to read this as a catalogue of failures, but that misses the point. The new Panchayati Raj system has changed the political landscape of rural governance. Regular elections are held. Women speak in meetings that were once entirely male. Marginalised communities sit in chairs they could not have occupied two generations ago. The weaknesses are not signs that decentralisation has failed but signs that it is incomplete.

Fixing them requires work on several fronts at once: a clearer assignment of functions across the three tiers, genuine fiscal devolution that puts untied money in panchayat hands, timely constitution of State Finance Commissions, stronger accountability of local bureaucracy to elected bodies, serious investment in training and infrastructure, and social interventions that help reservations translate into real voice. None of this is technical – all of it is political.

What do you think? If you had to pick one reform to strengthen panchayats – financial autonomy, clearer functional boundaries, or bureaucratic accountability – which would you prioritise and why? And do you think the problem of proxy representation can be solved through policy, or does it require deeper social change?

How useful was this post?

Click on a star to rate it!

Average rating 0 / 5. Vote count: 0

No votes so far! Be the first to rate this post.

We are sorry that this post was not useful for you!

Let us improve this post!

Tell us how we can improve this post?

References
  1. https://www.rgics.org/governance/panchayati-raj-institutions-thirty-years-after-the-73rd-amendment-of-the-indian-constitution/
  2. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4964346
  3. https://ijcrt.org/papers/IJCRT2307436.pdf
  4. https://www.taxtmi.com/news?id=20987
  5. https://prsindia.org/policy/report-summaries/devolution-of-funds-under-panchayati-raj-system
  6. https://india.mongabay.com/2023/03/state-finance-commissions-in-poor-shape/
  7. https://www.britannica.com/topic/panchayati-raj
  8. https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s316026d60ff9b54410b3435b403afd226/uploads/2024/12/20241230553666033.pdf
  9. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0019556117735461

Comments

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Decentralisation and Local Governance

1 Concept, Evolution and Significance of Democratic Decentralisation

  1. Concept of Democratic Decentralisation
  2. Evolution of Democratic Decentralisation
  3. Significance of Democratic Decentralisation
  4. Democratic Decentralisation in India

2 Contextual Dimensions of Democratic Decentralisation-1- Political, Constitutional and Administrative

  1. Post Modernist Critique
  2. The Political Environment of Choice
  3. Constitutional Dimension
  4. Administrative Argument
  5. The Decentralisation Debate

3 Contextual Dimensions of Democratic Decentralisation-Ii- Social, Economic and Geographical

  1. Social Dimension of Democratic Decentralisation
  2. Geographical Context of Democratic Decentralisation
  3. Economic Context
  4. Democratic Decentralisation: Means for Good Governance

4 Understanding Decentralisation in Contemporary Settings

  1. Legislative Framework of Decentralisation
  2. Political Decentralisation
  3. Functional Decentralisation
  4. Administrative Decentralisation
  5. Financial Decentralisation

5 Components of Decentralised Development – I- Empowerment

  1. Empowerment: The Concept
  2. Need for Empowerment
  3. Empowerment: National Attempts
  4. Empowerment: Grassroots Initiatives
  5. Empowerment: Operational Framework
  6. Empowerment: Problems and Constraints
  7. Empowerment: The Road Ahead

6 Components of Decentralised Development – II- Socioeconomic and Politico-administrative

  1. Socio-Economic Component of Decentralisation
  2. Politico-Administrative Component of Decentralisation
  3. Steps/Measures to Strengthen the Socio-Economic and Politico-Administrative Components

7 Components of Decentralised Development – III Equal Distribution of Benefits of Development

  1. What do you understand by Development
  2. The Principal of Desert
  3. The Principle of Need
  4. The Principle of Balance
  5. Factors Influencing People’s Preference for Distribution – In Small Groups
  6. Factors Influencing People’s Preferences for Distribution – Society wide distributions of resources

8 Partnership Among Different Levels of Government – I- Union and State Governments

  1. Rationale and Limitations
  2. Different Fields of Partnership
  3. Multi-layer decision making
  4. Role of the Government
  5. The Role as ‘Enabler’ and the Importance of Governance
  6. Governance Initiatives in Intellectual Property Rights
  7. The Role as a Provider of Infrastructure
  8. The Role as Investor in Social Sectors

9 Partnership Among Different Levels of Government – II- Local Authorities and Special Purpose Agencies

  1. Partnership among Local Authorities and Special Purpose Agencies in Education Sector
  2. Partnership among Local Authorities and Special Purpose Agencies in Health Sector
  3. Partnership among Local Authorities and Special Purpose Agencies in Telecommunications Sector
  4. Empower Various Agencies
  5. Evaluation of Special Purpose Agencies

10 Partnership Between Local Government and Non-State Agencies/Actors

  1. Need for Partnership
  2. Bhagidari: A Programme of Government-Citizen Partnership
  3. Realising Bhagidari
  4. Critical Success Gaps
  5. Bhagidari: A Model of Good Governance

11 Impact of Decentralised Development

  1. Political Decentralization
  2. Functional Decentralisation
  3. Financial Decentralisation
  4. Administrative Decentralisation
  5. Suggestions for Strengthening Decentralised Development

12 Evolution of Local Governance (Before 73rd & 74th) Amendment

  1. Historical Overview
  2. Post-independence Developments
  3. Committees in Chronological Order of Appearance
  4. Weakness of the New Panchayati Raj System
  5. Evolution of Urban Local Government in India
  6. Issues in Urban Governance

13 Features Of 73rd and 74th constitutional Amendment

  1. Features of 73rd Constitutional Amendment
  2. Features of 74th Constitutional Amendment
  3. Decentralised Planning in Context of 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Act
  4. Initiatives after Economic Reforms
  5. Functioning of PRIs in Various States after 73rd Amendment
  6. Functioning of Local Governance after 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment

14 Organisational Structure of Rural Local Bodies

  1. Historical Background
  2. Democratic Decentralisation – Panchayati Raj
  3. Structure of Panchayati Raj System
  4. 73rd Amendment Act and Powers and Functions
  5. Administrative Framework
  6. Devolution of Powers and Functions – Actual Position

15 Organisational Structure of Urban Local Bodies

  1. Historical Evolution of Urban Local Government
  2. Organizational Structure
  3. The Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992
  4. Municipal Finance in the Wake of the 74th Amendment

16 Intra-Local Government Relationship-I– Rural

  1. Gram Sabha and Gram Panchayat
  2. Connectivity through Membership
  3. Intra-tier Distribution of Powers and Functions
  4. Intra-tier Responsibilities: The Eleventh Schedule
  5. Intra-tier Implementation Hurdles

17 Intra-Local Government Relationship- II- Urban

  1. Sub-Units of Urban Local Government
  2. Trend towards Consolidation
  3. Polycentricity
  4. Lessons for India
  5. Requirements in Work Distribution Intra-tier

18 Development Planning- Nature and Scope

  1. Rationale of Development Planning
  2. Multi-Level Planning
  3. Context of Development Planning
  4. Requirements in Developing Planning

19 Micro Level Plans- Formulation and Implementation

  1. Macro Level Planning: Limitations
  2. Issues in Micro Level Planning
  3. Constraints in Micro Level Planning
  4. Micro Level Planning in the Five-Year Plans
  5. Tenth Plan Priorities

20 Structural Reforms- Resources, Finances, Powers and Functions

  1. Structure of Local Bodies
  2. Powers and Functions of Local Bodies
  3. Infrastructure for Planning
  4. Modalities for People’s Participation
  5. Resources of Local Bodies
  6. Agenda for the Future