More than three decades have passed since the 73rd Constitutional Amendment promised to turn villages into vibrant units of self-government. The vision was ambitious: hand over real power, real money, and real staff to elected representatives at the grassroots. But three decades on, the picture on the ground is mixed. In some states, Panchayats plan their own budgets, run schools, and manage health centres. In others, they function as little more than extensions of the state bureaucracy. This gap between constitutional intent and field reality is what the term “actual position of devolution” tries to capture.
Table of Contents
- The constitutional promise: what devolution was supposed to look like
- Actual position on the ground: an uneven landscape
- The front-runners
- The laggards
- The three F’s examined individually
- Functions: confusion more than clarity
- Funds: the weakest link
- Functionaries: staff without reporting lines
- Why devolution has stalled: the structural obstacles
- Bureaucratic resistance
- Weak political will
- Capacity constraints
- Gender and social inclusion gaps
- The positive trends worth noticing
- The road ahead: what genuine devolution would require
The constitutional promise: what devolution was supposed to look like
The 73rd Amendment Act, which came into force on 24 April 1993, gave Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) constitutional status for the first time. The amendment introduced provisions enabling States to transfer powers and responsibilities to Panchayats for preparing plans for economic development and social justice, covering 29 subjects listed in the Eleventh Schedule. These subjects range from agriculture and minor irrigation to primary education, health, drinking water, and social welfare.
The operating idea is captured in what practitioners call the 3Fs – Functions, Funds, and Functionaries. True devolution means all three have to move together. Giving Panchayats a list of duties without money or staff is an empty gesture. Giving them staff without authority over planning is equally hollow. Article 243G empowers the State Legislature to make provisions for devolution of powers to Panchayats at the appropriate level, but the key phrase here is “State Legislature.” Local government is a State subject, which means the centre can nudge and persuade but cannot compel states to part with authority.
Actual position on the ground: an uneven landscape
The most authoritative snapshot of where things stand comes from the Panchayat Devolution Index 2024, prepared by the Indian Institute of Public Administration for the Ministry of Panchayati Raj. The latest report reveals that overall devolution increased from 39.9 percent to 43.9 percent between 2013-14 and 2021-22 – a modest improvement over eight years, which itself tells a story. Progress is real, but it is slow.
The index measures devolution across six dimensions: Framework, Functions, Finances, Functionaries, Capacity Building, and Accountability. What the rankings reveal is a striking state-by-state divergence.
The front-runners
Karnataka ranks first in the 2024 index with a score of 72.23, followed by Kerala at 70.59, Tamil Nadu at 68.38, Maharashtra at 61.44, and Uttar Pradesh at 60.07. These southern and western states have built administrative architecture that actually lets Panchayats function as local governments. Karnataka, in particular, has delegated a large number of functions to Panchayats and given them substantial roles in implementing Union government schemes.
Kerala deserves a closer look because its approach has been genuinely transformative. The state launched its People’s Planning Campaign in 1996 as a socio-political movement to deepen decentralised planning, and Kerala Panchayats now enter the functional domain of nearly all 29 subjects listed in the Eleventh Schedule. The combination of political will, detailed activity mapping, and fiscal decentralisation made Kerala a reference model for the rest of the country.
The laggards
At the other end of the spectrum, states like Goa, Haryana, Jharkhand, Punjab, and several northeastern states and Union Territories remain below the national average of 43.89 and are classified as ‘aspirational’. In these places, Panchayats often exist as elected bodies on paper but lack the authority, staff, or money to act meaningfully on local priorities.
An older but telling observation from investigative reporting noted that out of 27 states reviewed, only seven had devolved all 29 functions to Panchayats as envisaged by the Constitution, and Karnataka was the only state that had transferred functionaries and funds for all 29 subjects. The gap between what the Constitution envisioned and what states actually delivered has been the central tension of decentralisation in India.
The three F’s examined individually
Functions: confusion more than clarity
On paper, the Eleventh Schedule lists 29 subjects. In practice, subjects like fuel and fodder, non-conventional energy, rural electrification, non-formal education, small-scale industries, and technical and vocational education have not been devolved in many states. Where devolution has happened, the problem often becomes one of overlap. State line departments for agriculture, health, or education continue to operate in parallel with Panchayats, and the demarcation of “who does what” between the Gram, Block, and District levels of PRIs is frequently unclear. This produces duplicated effort, competing claims of authority, and citizens who do not know which office to approach.
The idea of activity mapping – specifying exactly which sub-activities within each of the 29 subjects belong to which tier – was meant to solve this. Only a handful of states have done it rigorously. Kerala is the standout example; most others have either skipped it or done it superficially.
Funds: the weakest link
Money is where decentralisation stumbles most. Of the 3Fs, funds have historically been the least devolved and most neglected by state governments, and local governments in most parts of the country are fundamentally unable to raise taxes, track expenditures, or deliver services at the local level. Most Panchayats depend almost entirely on transfers from higher tiers. Own Source Revenue (OSR) – income from property tax, user charges, rentals, and local fees – remains thin. Reluctance to tax neighbours, limited tax bases in rural areas, and weak enforcement machinery all contribute.
Central Finance Commission grants have tried to close the gap. The 15th Finance Commission allocated a substantially larger pool of untied funds to local bodies than any of its predecessors. But untied funds reach Panchayats only if State governments release them promptly and without strings attached, which does not always happen. A recent parliamentary committee observed that despite the constitutional mandate, devolution of functions, funds, and functionaries to PRIs remains incomplete, and many Panchayats operate with limited administrative authority, inadequate financial resources, and without effective planning control.
State Finance Commissions (SFCs), which are supposed to meet every five years to decide vertical and horizontal sharing of resources, have a patchy record. Several states have been late in constituting them, tardy in accepting their recommendations, or selective in implementation.
Functionaries: staff without reporting lines
The third F is often forgotten in the conversation but may be the most decisive. A Gram Panchayat without staff it can direct is a hollow institution. In most states, personnel working on Panchayat subjects – the agriculture extension officer, the primary school teacher, the ANM at the sub-health centre – continue to report to their parent line departments, not to the elected Panchayat. This creates a dual authority problem: the Sarpanch can request action, but the officer’s career depends on the district bureaucracy. Functional subordination of line department staff to PRIs has been achieved in very few states.
Why devolution has stalled: the structural obstacles
Bureaucratic resistance
Ceding authority is rarely welcome. Line departments continue to dominate key areas like health, education, and sanitation, reducing local institutions to implementation agencies, and bureaucratic control over funds and planning often sidelines elected representatives. District Collectors and Block Development Officers, long accustomed to being the final authority in rural India, have not always adapted gracefully to working alongside elected Sarpanchas.
Weak political will
Strong Panchayats create alternative centres of power. Sitting MLAs and MPs sometimes view vibrant Sarpanchas as competitors for patronage networks, not partners in development. This quiet political calculation helps explain why some ruling parties at the State level have preferred nominal devolution over genuine transfer.
Capacity constraints
Elected representatives, especially in remote Panchayats, often come to office without prior experience in budgeting, procurement, or scheme design. Training programmes under the Rashtriya Gram Swaraj Abhiyan have helped – the capacity enhancement component of the Devolution Index rose from 44 percent to 54.6 percent between 2013-14 and 2021-22 – but the gap between constitutional aspiration and administrative reality remains wide.
Gender and social inclusion gaps
Reservation has brought women, Scheduled Castes, and Scheduled Tribes into elected office in unprecedented numbers. Yet while there were around 2.95 million elected Panchayat representatives in 2014, of whom 46 percent were women, 19 percent from Scheduled Castes, and 12 percent from Scheduled Tribes, the phenomenon of proxy representation – where a husband or senior male relative effectively runs the affairs of a woman Sarpanch – has not disappeared. Meaningful devolution requires not just seats but voice.
The positive trends worth noticing
The story is not one of unrelieved failure. Several encouraging shifts are visible. Digital infrastructure has improved dramatically: e-Panchayat platforms, the eGramSwaraj portal for planning and accounting, SVAMITVA for rural property mapping, and public disclosure of Panchayat accounts online have all gained traction. Regular Panchayat elections are now the norm in most states. Women’s representation has crossed 46 percent overall, and in states like Kerala, Bihar, and Karnataka, reservation has gone beyond the one-third constitutional floor to 50 percent.
Gram Panchayat Development Plans (GPDPs), prepared annually with community consultation, are slowly becoming the vehicle through which local priorities are translated into expenditure. Convergence with flagship schemes like MGNREGA, Swachh Bharat Mission, and PMAY-G has enabled Panchayats to deliver visible outcomes even where formal devolution of the 29 subjects remains partial.
The road ahead: what genuine devolution would require
The direction of reform is reasonably clear. States need to complete activity mapping so that functional boundaries stop overlapping. SFCs need to be constituted on time and their recommendations acted upon. Panchayats need control, not just coexistence, over functionaries working on devolved subjects. Own Source Revenue has to be taken seriously as a policy priority, with Panchayats empowered and equipped to collect local taxes and fees. And accountability mechanisms – social audits, regular Gram Sabha meetings, public display of accounts – need to be deepened so that devolved power does not simply shift capture from the district bureaucracy to the local elite.
The parliamentary committee recommendation that the Panchayati Raj Ministry publish an annual “State of Devolution Report” and that the central government link financial incentives under grants and schemes to actual progress on devolution points to a useful lever. If states know that foot-dragging has fiscal consequences, the incentive calculus could shift.
What do you think? Should the Union government have sharper tools – including conditional fiscal transfers – to push reluctant states toward genuine devolution, even though local government is constitutionally a State subject? And in your own district, does the Panchayat feel like a government that governs, or an implementation wing of someone else’s plans?
References
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panchayati_raj_in_India
- https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1784195
- https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2102965
- https://decentralization.net/2025/02/the-status-of-devolution-to-panchayats-in-india/
- https://crmindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Kerala.pdf
- https://www.downtoearth.org.in/coverage/f-for-failure-5428
- https://compass.rauias.com/polity/challenges-panchayati-raj-institutions/
- https://accountabilityindia.in/sites/default/files/policy-brief/panchayatbrief2.pdf
- https://prsindia.org/policy/report-summaries/devolution-of-funds-under-panchayati-raj-system
- https://www.iasexam.com/mains-focus-21st-july-2025/
- https://idronline.org/power-to-the-people-the-journey-of-panchayati-raj-institutions/
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