When India passed the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act in 1992, it promised to reshape rural governance by giving villages a constitutional right to self-rule. Three decades on, the reality is a patchwork. Some states have genuinely empowered their Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs), while others have struggled to move beyond paper compliance. Understanding how PRIs have actually functioned across states reveals the gap between constitutional vision and ground-level governance.

Table of Contents

The constitutional mandate and what states were asked to do

The 73rd Amendment was not a suggestion. It placed binding obligations on every state. Within a year of the amendment’s enactment, states were required to pass conforming legislation, establish a three-tier Panchayat structure at village, block, and district levels, hold regular five-year elections, and reserve seats for women, Scheduled Castes, and Scheduled Tribes. The amendment also required every state to set up a State Election Commission to oversee PRI elections and a State Finance Commission every five years to review panchayat finances.

The heart of the amendment, however, lay in the Eleventh Schedule. It listed 29 subjects, from agriculture and rural housing to primary education, health, and women’s welfare, that states could devolve to Panchayats under Article 243-G. But the Constitution stopped short of making this devolution compulsory in detail. It left the extent and manner of transferring the famous “3 Fs” – Functions, Finances, and Functionaries – to each state legislature. That single design choice explains much of the uneven progress that followed.

States that led from the front

A small group of states treated the 73rd Amendment as an opportunity rather than an obligation, and their PRIs reflect that attitude.

Kerala’s big bang approach

Kerala is widely regarded as the gold standard. Following its 1994 Panchayati Raj Act, the state launched the People’s Plan Campaign on 17 August 1996, an initiative that became globally recognised as one of the most significant institutional reforms in public governance. During the Ninth Plan, the government devolved around 35 to 40 percent of the state development budget to local governments, letting communities decide and implement their own priorities. Kerala has also transferred all 29 functions listed in the Eleventh Schedule to its Panchayats, paired with robust Gram Sabhas and participatory budgeting at the ward level.

Karnataka’s financial pioneering

Karnataka was an early mover on financial devolution. The state made mandatory transfers of united funds to PRIs and empowered them to collect up to seven types of taxes, creating real fiscal space at the local level. The Karnataka Panchayati Raj Act also embedded mandatory Gram Sabhas and transparent budget discussions, giving citizens tools to hold elected representatives accountable. In the Ministry of Panchayati Raj’s 2024 devolution ranking, Karnataka was placed first, followed by Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, and Uttar Pradesh.

West Bengal’s early start

West Bengal’s PRI story actually pre-dates the 73rd Amendment. The state inaugurated its three-tier panchayat system through the West Bengal Panchayat Act of 1973, nearly two decades before constitutional status was conferred. Consistent election cycles and a political commitment across successive governments allowed West Bengal to channel rural development schemes through Panchayats rather than around them. The state also ranks high in average Panchayat revenue.

Other notable performers

Beyond these three, a National Council of Applied Economic Research assessment found that only five states – Arunachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal – had effectively devolved all 29 functions to PRIs, while the remaining states had devolved an average of around 21 out of 29. Tamil Nadu and Sikkim deserve mention for their comprehensive legislative compliance, even though Tamil Nadu’s record on devolving functionaries has been weaker.

States that have lagged behind

For every success story, there are states where PRIs remain under-empowered. Bihar, Jharkhand, and Uttar Pradesh have historically struggled, held back by weak financial devolution, caste-based political interference, and limited administrative support. Odisha and Madhya Pradesh show mixed results, with some impressive legislative steps such as Odisha increasing women’s reservation to 50 percent, but capacity on the ground remains thin.

The Panchayat Devolution Index report notes that only around 60 percent of 15th Finance Commission grants were utilised in Bihar and Jharkhand, largely due to bureaucratic delays, and that a study in Odisha and Madhya Pradesh showed only about 35 percent of elected Panchayat representatives had received governance training. That combination of weak absorption capacity and limited training keeps PRIs in these states more dependent on the district administration than on their own elected bodies.

The persistent problem of delayed elections

One of the clearest tests of PRI health is whether elections happen on time. The 73rd Amendment requires elections every five years, but several states have repeatedly missed this deadline. A study sponsored by the Ministry of Panchayati Raj and conducted by the Indian Institute of Public Administration found that Panchayat elections had been delayed in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Haryana, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, and Puducherry, with State Election Commissions often dependent on state governments for staff and finances, which compromises their independence.

When elections are postponed, elected representatives are replaced by administrators, and the very premise of decentralisation collapses. Rural citizens are left without a local voice for months or years at a stretch.

The three Fs: where devolution falters

The 3Fs remain the single most honest yardstick for measuring PRI performance. Each presents its own set of obstacles.

Functions

While the Eleventh Schedule lists 29 subjects, a 2015-16 devolution report by the Ministry of Panchayati Raj pointed out that real devolution still has a long way to go, covering not just functions but also the supporting systems of capacity building, accountability, and transparency. In many states, administrative orders on paper have not translated into actual authority. Line departments and their bureaucrats continue to call the shots on schemes that officially belong to Panchayats.

Finances

Financial autonomy is where most PRIs struggle. Own-source revenue remains weak, with many Gram Panchayats reluctant or unable to raise taxes beyond basic sources such as shop rentals, house tax, and water fees. Disparities are stark. The Ministry of Panchayati Raj’s 2024 assessment showed Kerala and West Bengal reporting average revenues of more than Rs 60 lakh and Rs 57 lakh respectively, while states like Andhra Pradesh and Punjab reported less than Rs 6 lakh. Direct Benefit Transfers and centrally sponsored schemes have further reduced the financial discretion Panchayats enjoy.

Functionaries

Transferring staff to work under Panchayats has been the most politically and administratively contentious task. Bureaucratic resistance, service-condition disputes, and state-level inertia have kept this process slow. The Standing Committee on Rural Development noted in 2018 that there is severe lack of support staff and personnel in panchayats – secretaries, junior engineers, computer operators, data entry operators – which directly affects their functioning and service delivery.

Bureaucratic dominance and parallel bodies

Perhaps the most subtle obstacle to PRI effectiveness is the continued grip of the bureaucracy. In many places, Gram Panchayats remain under tight bureaucratic control, Block Development Officers wield considerable power, and recommendations of State Finance Commissions are often delayed or ignored. Officials often control meeting agendas, handle finances independently, and take key decisions without meaningfully consulting elected representatives.

Another worrying trend is the creation of parallel bodies that absorb functions meant for PRIs. Haryana, for instance, set up a Rural Development Agency under the Chief Minister’s chairmanship to oversee the work of local bodies, effectively duplicating and sometimes overriding Panchayat authority. Such structures quietly hollow out decentralisation even while states claim legislative compliance.

Social representation: the quiet revolution

It would be unfair to focus only on shortcomings. The 73rd Amendment has genuinely transformed who holds political power in rural India. India now has around 2.6 lakh Panchayats with roughly 3.1 million elected representatives, of whom about 1.3 million are women. Several states, including Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, and Bihar, have raised women’s reservation to 50 percent. That is easily the largest presence of women in elected office anywhere in the world.

The caveat is the Sarpanch Pati phenomenon, where husbands or male relatives of elected women effectively run the office, undermining the spirit of reservation. Similar issues affect SC and ST representatives in villages dominated by upper castes. Representation on paper has not always translated into real authority.

What the data tells us overall

The Ministry of Panchayati Raj’s Devolution Index, calculated by the Indian Institute of Public Administration, scores states on six dimensions, namely framework, functions, finances, functionaries, capacity enhancement, and accountability. According to its latest assessment, overall devolution across India rose from 39.9 percent in 2013-14 to 43.9 percent in 2021-22, an improvement but hardly a transformation. Uttar Pradesh and Bihar have shown encouraging upward movement, while smaller states and union territories continue to struggle.

Three broad lessons emerge. Political will matters most, because states where top leadership has championed decentralisation have seen consistent improvement regardless of political party. Financial autonomy is non-negotiable, since without predictable fund flows and local revenue capacity, PRIs cannot function as self-government. Capacity building is the weakest link, as devolving functions to institutions whose members have never been trained in planning or accounting almost guarantees underperformance.

What do you think? Should the central government play a more assertive role in enforcing uniform devolution across states, or does the constitutional flexibility given to state legislatures actually allow for necessary local adaptation? And how much of the variation we see across states is really about law, and how much is about political culture?

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References
  1. https://www.britannica.com/topic/panchayati-raj
  2. https://spb.kerala.gov.in/en/decentralised-planning-division
  3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People's_Planning_in_Kerala
  4. https://www.lawcentrum.com/specialarticles/an-overview-of-panchayat-raj-institutions-and-devolution-of-funds,-functions-and-functionaries-(3fs)-in-india/law-centrum
  5. https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/status-of-devolution-to-panchayats-in-states-2024-report
  6. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panchayati_raj_in_India
  7. https://accountabilityindia.in/sites/default/files/policy-brief/panchayatbrief2.pdf
  8. https://www.ensureias.com/blog/current-affairs/panchayat-devolution-index-2024
  9. https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s316026d60ff9b54410b3435b403afd226/uploads/2024/07/202407181366823679.pdf
  10. https://idronline.org/power-to-the-people-the-journey-of-panchayati-raj-institutions/
  11. https://www.drishtiias.com/important-institutions/drishti-specials-important-institutions-national-institutions/panchayati-raj-institution-pri
  12. https://ilearncana.com/details/Panchayati-Raj-Institutions-PRIs/5057
  13. https://www.civilsdaily.com/story/panchayati-raj-institutions-issues-and-challenges/

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Decentralisation and Local Governance

1 Concept, Evolution and Significance of Democratic Decentralisation

  1. Concept of Democratic Decentralisation
  2. Evolution of Democratic Decentralisation
  3. Significance of Democratic Decentralisation
  4. Democratic Decentralisation in India

2 Contextual Dimensions of Democratic Decentralisation-1- Political, Constitutional and Administrative

  1. Post Modernist Critique
  2. The Political Environment of Choice
  3. Constitutional Dimension
  4. Administrative Argument
  5. The Decentralisation Debate

3 Contextual Dimensions of Democratic Decentralisation-Ii- Social, Economic and Geographical

  1. Social Dimension of Democratic Decentralisation
  2. Geographical Context of Democratic Decentralisation
  3. Economic Context
  4. Democratic Decentralisation: Means for Good Governance

4 Understanding Decentralisation in Contemporary Settings

  1. Legislative Framework of Decentralisation
  2. Political Decentralisation
  3. Functional Decentralisation
  4. Administrative Decentralisation
  5. Financial Decentralisation

5 Components of Decentralised Development – I- Empowerment

  1. Empowerment: The Concept
  2. Need for Empowerment
  3. Empowerment: National Attempts
  4. Empowerment: Grassroots Initiatives
  5. Empowerment: Operational Framework
  6. Empowerment: Problems and Constraints
  7. Empowerment: The Road Ahead

6 Components of Decentralised Development – II- Socioeconomic and Politico-administrative

  1. Socio-Economic Component of Decentralisation
  2. Politico-Administrative Component of Decentralisation
  3. Steps/Measures to Strengthen the Socio-Economic and Politico-Administrative Components

7 Components of Decentralised Development – III Equal Distribution of Benefits of Development

  1. What do you understand by Development
  2. The Principal of Desert
  3. The Principle of Need
  4. The Principle of Balance
  5. Factors Influencing People’s Preference for Distribution – In Small Groups
  6. Factors Influencing People’s Preferences for Distribution – Society wide distributions of resources

8 Partnership Among Different Levels of Government – I- Union and State Governments

  1. Rationale and Limitations
  2. Different Fields of Partnership
  3. Multi-layer decision making
  4. Role of the Government
  5. The Role as ‘Enabler’ and the Importance of Governance
  6. Governance Initiatives in Intellectual Property Rights
  7. The Role as a Provider of Infrastructure
  8. The Role as Investor in Social Sectors

9 Partnership Among Different Levels of Government – II- Local Authorities and Special Purpose Agencies

  1. Partnership among Local Authorities and Special Purpose Agencies in Education Sector
  2. Partnership among Local Authorities and Special Purpose Agencies in Health Sector
  3. Partnership among Local Authorities and Special Purpose Agencies in Telecommunications Sector
  4. Empower Various Agencies
  5. Evaluation of Special Purpose Agencies

10 Partnership Between Local Government and Non-State Agencies/Actors

  1. Need for Partnership
  2. Bhagidari: A Programme of Government-Citizen Partnership
  3. Realising Bhagidari
  4. Critical Success Gaps
  5. Bhagidari: A Model of Good Governance

11 Impact of Decentralised Development

  1. Political Decentralization
  2. Functional Decentralisation
  3. Financial Decentralisation
  4. Administrative Decentralisation
  5. Suggestions for Strengthening Decentralised Development

12 Evolution of Local Governance (Before 73rd & 74th) Amendment

  1. Historical Overview
  2. Post-independence Developments
  3. Committees in Chronological Order of Appearance
  4. Weakness of the New Panchayati Raj System
  5. Evolution of Urban Local Government in India
  6. Issues in Urban Governance

13 Features Of 73rd and 74th constitutional Amendment

  1. Features of 73rd Constitutional Amendment
  2. Features of 74th Constitutional Amendment
  3. Decentralised Planning in Context of 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Act
  4. Initiatives after Economic Reforms
  5. Functioning of PRIs in Various States after 73rd Amendment
  6. Functioning of Local Governance after 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment

14 Organisational Structure of Rural Local Bodies

  1. Historical Background
  2. Democratic Decentralisation – Panchayati Raj
  3. Structure of Panchayati Raj System
  4. 73rd Amendment Act and Powers and Functions
  5. Administrative Framework
  6. Devolution of Powers and Functions – Actual Position

15 Organisational Structure of Urban Local Bodies

  1. Historical Evolution of Urban Local Government
  2. Organizational Structure
  3. The Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992
  4. Municipal Finance in the Wake of the 74th Amendment

16 Intra-Local Government Relationship-I– Rural

  1. Gram Sabha and Gram Panchayat
  2. Connectivity through Membership
  3. Intra-tier Distribution of Powers and Functions
  4. Intra-tier Responsibilities: The Eleventh Schedule
  5. Intra-tier Implementation Hurdles

17 Intra-Local Government Relationship- II- Urban

  1. Sub-Units of Urban Local Government
  2. Trend towards Consolidation
  3. Polycentricity
  4. Lessons for India
  5. Requirements in Work Distribution Intra-tier

18 Development Planning- Nature and Scope

  1. Rationale of Development Planning
  2. Multi-Level Planning
  3. Context of Development Planning
  4. Requirements in Developing Planning

19 Micro Level Plans- Formulation and Implementation

  1. Macro Level Planning: Limitations
  2. Issues in Micro Level Planning
  3. Constraints in Micro Level Planning
  4. Micro Level Planning in the Five-Year Plans
  5. Tenth Plan Priorities

20 Structural Reforms- Resources, Finances, Powers and Functions

  1. Structure of Local Bodies
  2. Powers and Functions of Local Bodies
  3. Infrastructure for Planning
  4. Modalities for People’s Participation
  5. Resources of Local Bodies
  6. Agenda for the Future