At first glance, the Indian Constitution appears to be a straightforward federal document – it divides powers between the Centre and the States, has a written framework, and recognises distinct governmental tiers. Yet, a closer reading reveals that this Constitution is far from a conventional federation. It carries a strong unitary core running through its very foundation. The framers of the Constitution were deliberate about this design. India’s sheer scale of diversity, the fragility of national unity at the time of independence, and the lessons drawn from the partition made it imperative to ensure that the Centre would always have the upper hand when it mattered most. The result is a constitutional arrangement that scholars have famously described as “federal in form but unitary in spirit.”
Table of Contents
- The deliberate choice of words: “Union of States,” not “Federation”
- One Constitution for all: the single constitutional framework
- Legislative supremacy of the Centre
- The Governor: the Centre’s extended arm in the states
- All India Services: unified administration across the nation
- Financial dominance of the Centre
- Emergency provisions and the suspension of federalism
- Parliament’s power over state territories
- The “quasi-federal” consensus
The deliberate choice of words: “Union of States,” not “Federation”
One of the most telling signs of the unitary bias in the Indian Constitution is the very first article. Article 1(1) declares that “India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States.” The word “federation” is conspicuously absent – and this was no oversight. The framers made a conscious choice to avoid the term.
This distinction carries significant legal and political weight. The term “Union of States” was preferred to show that the Indian Union was not formed through a negotiated agreement among pre-existing states, and that no state has the right to secede. In a true federation, like the United States, the constituent units come together voluntarily and may retain certain sovereign rights. In India, the Union is indestructible even if its constituent states can be reorganised, renamed, or even dissolved by Parliament through a simple majority.
The Supreme Court reinforced this in State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1963), ruling that the term “Union of States” implies the indestructibility of the Union and reinforces the central government’s supremacy over the states. This seemingly semantic choice thus sets the tone for the entire constitutional structure.
One Constitution for all: the single constitutional framework
In most federal countries, the constituent units have the right to frame their own constitutions. The states in the United States, for instance, each have their own constitutions that operate alongside the federal constitution. India takes a fundamentally different approach.
The Constitution of India embodies not only the constitution of the Centre but also those of the states, and both must operate within this single frame. There is no separate state constitution. Every state government – its structure, its powers, the office of the Governor, the State Legislature, the High Courts – all derive their existence and authority from the single national Constitution. This is a markedly unitary feature.
A related aspect is single citizenship. Unlike federations such as the United States, where citizens hold dual citizenship (state and federal), the Indian Constitution embraced a single citizenship system, ensuring that all citizens, regardless of their birthplace or current residence, have equal rights throughout the entire country. A citizen of West Bengal is equally a citizen of Karnataka or any other state, with the same set of fundamental rights enforceable across the nation. This uniformity of citizenship is a classic unitary attribute.
Legislative supremacy of the Centre
The distribution of legislative powers in the Constitution is tilted unmistakably in the Centre’s favour. The Seventh Schedule divides legislative subjects into three lists: the Union List, the State List, and the Concurrent List.
This is a significant departure from a genuine federal model. In the United States and Australia, residuary powers generally vest with the states. In India, the opposite is true. Parliament can also legislate on State List subjects under certain circumstances – for instance, if the Rajya Sabha passes a resolution in national interest, or during a national emergency, or if two or more states request Parliament to legislate on their behalf. This capacity to convert the federal structure into a unitary one without a formal constitutional amendment is unheard of in any other federation.
The Governor: the Centre’s extended arm in the states
Perhaps the most direct institutional mechanism through which the Centre exercises influence over states is the office of the Governor. Every state in India has a Governor who is not elected by the people of the state, but is instead appointed from above.
The Governor of a State is appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal, and holds office at the pleasure of the President. In practice, since the President acts on the advice of the Council of Ministers, it is effectively the Union Cabinet – the central government – that decides who becomes the Governor of a state.
The primary function of the Governor is to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution and the law as per the oath of office under Article 159 of the Constitution in the administration of state affairs. However, in political practice, the Governor’s role has often been contentious. Because the Union government can replace a Governor at any time, it is possible that Governors may act in a manner consistent with what the Union Government wants, which can work to the detriment of the state – especially when the state legislature is controlled by a different party than the Union government.
The Governor also has the power to reserve bills passed by the State Legislature for the President’s consideration, to report a constitutional breakdown in the state, and to recommend the imposition of President’s Rule under Article 356. These powers effectively make the Governor a conduit for central oversight over state governance – a feature that sits uneasily with classical federal theory.
All India Services: unified administration across the nation
Another significant unitary feature lies in the structure of the civil services. India maintains a set of All India Services – principally the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), the Indian Police Service (IPS), and the Indian Forest Service (IFS) – that are common to both the Centre and the states.
All India Service officers are common to the Centre and the states, and these three service cadres are widely regarded as violating the essential principles of federalism. Officers of the IAS and IPS, though recruited and trained by the Centre through the Union Public Service Commission, are allocated to state cadres and serve under state governments. However, their ultimate loyalty, service conditions, disciplinary authority, and career progression remain tied to the Centre.
This creates a dual accountability that tends to favour central interests. State governments cannot unilaterally dismiss or significantly discipline an IAS or IPS officer – such actions require central concurrence. This gives the Centre a powerful lever in the administration of every state, regardless of which political party is in power at the state level. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar had argued in favour of such a system precisely because it would ensure a uniform administrative ethos across the country and prevent states from building insular bureaucratic systems.
Financial dominance of the Centre
In any governmental system, financial power is real power. The Constitution grants the Centre a dominant position in the realm of public finance as well. The major revenue-generating taxes – income tax, corporation tax, customs duties, central excise – are levied and collected by the Centre. States, by contrast, depend heavily on their share of central taxes and on grants-in-aid from the Centre to meet their expenditure requirements.
To manage this fiscal relationship, Finance Commissions are periodically constituted by the President of India under Article 280 of the Constitution to define the financial relations between the central government and individual state governments. Vertical devolution – the share of central taxes distributed to all states collectively – has progressively increased over time, from around 30% in early commissions to 41% as recommended by the 15th Finance Commission.
Yet, the key point is that states are dependent on this sharing mechanism rather than having independent, self-sufficient revenue bases. The Centre also extends grants-in-aid to states from the Consolidated Fund of India. The Union government has vast financial powers, and states need adequate resources to meet their developmental needs – which is precisely what makes the Finance Commission mechanism so consequential for the Centre-State balance. The Centre’s ability to attach conditions to these grants further increases its leverage over state policy priorities.
Emergency provisions and the suspension of federalism
The Constitution’s emergency provisions represent the most dramatic expression of its unitary potential. During a national emergency under Article 352, a declaration can result in a significant concentration of power in the hands of the Central Government, which then gains authority over several state functions, effectively centralising power.
Under Article 356 – commonly referred to as President’s Rule – the President can dismiss a state government and assume direct authority over the state if the constitutional machinery in the state is found to have broken down. Article 356 permits the President to dismiss a state government and assume direct authority if a situation arises in which state government cannot be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. This provision has been widely used and, at times, misused in India’s political history, prompting the Supreme Court to lay down strict guidelines in the landmark S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) case.
Similarly, during a financial emergency under Article 360, the Centre can direct states on how to manage their finances. The very existence of these provisions – capable of fundamentally altering the federal balance without any constitutional amendment – reflects the Constitution’s unitary undercurrent.
Parliament’s power over state territories
In a genuine federation, the territorial integrity of constituent units is typically protected. States cannot be unilaterally divided, merged, or renamed without their consent. India operates very differently. Parliament has the most direct power over the states through its ability to unilaterally create new states out of territories or existing states and to modify and diminish the boundaries of existing states – requiring only a simple majority, with no supermajority requirements. The states involved do not have a binding say; their legislature is consulted but its views are not binding.
This was demonstrated dramatically in 2019 when the state of Jammu & Kashmir was bifurcated and reorganised into two union territories by an Act of Parliament. Such an exercise of authority over a state’s territorial existence would be inconceivable in a truly federal system.
The “quasi-federal” consensus
Constitutional scholars have long grappled with how to characterise the Indian model. Professor K.C. Wheare described it as “a unitary state with subsidiary federal features rather than a federal state with subsidiary unitary features,” while Jennings characterised it as “a federation with a strong centralising tendency.”
Both characterisations point to the same conclusion: the unitary features of the Indian Constitution are not peripheral or exceptional – they are central to its design. The framers, led by Dr. Ambedkar, were clear-eyed about this. As Ambedkar himself stated in the Constituent Assembly, the Constitution “would be both unitary as well as federal according to the requirements of time and circumstances.” This flexible duality was a deliberate response to India’s complex social, linguistic, and political realities.
The Supreme Court, in Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, affirmed that federalism is a basic feature of the Constitution of India, and it is unique in its nature and tailored according to the specific needs of the country. Yet, the Court has also consistently upheld the Centre’s overarching authority in matters of national unity, security, and governance uniformity.
What emerges, then, is a constitutional model that is neither purely unitary nor purely federal – but one that is calibrated to ensure that, when the chips are down, national unity and effective central governance take precedence. This is the enduring design logic of the Indian Constitution’s unitary aspects.
What do you think? Given the frequency with which emergency provisions and President’s Rule have been invoked in India’s political history, do the unitary features of the Constitution strengthen national unity – or do they risk undermining the spirit of federalism that the Constitution also seeks to uphold? And with states increasingly asserting their fiscal and administrative rights, is it time to revisit the balance of power between the Centre and the states?
References
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