Terms and Conditions of Service for State Information Commission Members

The State Information Commission (SIC) stands as a vital pillar in making the Right to Information Act, 2005 work at the ground level. But the strength of any such body depends heavily on who serves in it, how long they serve, and under what conditions. The terms and conditions of service for the State Chief Information Commissioner (SCIC) and State Information Commissioners (SICs) have gone through a significant transformation over the years, especially after the RTI (Amendment) Act, 2019. Understanding this shift is crucial for anyone studying how transparency institutions function in a democracy.

The original framework under Section 16 of the RTI Act, 2005 🔗

When Parliament enacted the RTI Act in 2005, it carefully designed the service conditions of information commissioners to shield them from political interference. Section 16 of the Act laid out a clear and protective framework for the SCIC and SICs.

Term of office: Five years or age 65 🔗

Under the original provisions, the SCIC would hold office for a term of five years from the date of entering office, or until reaching the age of sixty-five years, whichever came earlier. The same rule applied to State Information Commissioners. Importantly, the SCIC was not eligible for reappointment, while an SIC could be elevated to the SCIC post, provided the total tenure did not exceed five years in aggregate.

This fixed tenure was a deliberate design choice. A pre-determined term, written into the parent law itself, meant that no government could shorten or extend the service of a commissioner based on convenience. It was a structural safeguard.

Salary and allowances: Parity with constitutional posts 🔗

The original RTI Act tied the pay of information commissioners to some of the highest offices in the country. As noted by transparency advocates, the law stated that the salaries, allowances, and service conditions of the State Chief Information Commissioner were equivalent to those of an Election Commissioner, while State Information Commissioners drew pay equivalent to the Chief Secretary of the state government.

This parity was not just about money. It conferred status, and status mattered because information commissioners often had to direct senior bureaucrats and powerful public authorities to release information. Without the backing of a high official rank, their orders might not carry the same weight.

Protection against salary reduction after appointment 🔗

The original framework also included a safeguard against arbitrary salary changes. Once appointed, the salaries and allowances of the SCIC and SICs could not be varied to their disadvantage. This was similar to the protection enjoyed by judges of constitutional courts, reinforcing the intended independence of the commissions.

The pension deduction clause 🔗

There was, however, one condition that often drew attention. If a person appointed as SCIC or SIC was already receiving a pension from previous government service, whether under a central or state government, or from a corporation or public sector undertaking, the salary drawn as commissioner would be reduced by an amount equivalent to the pension. Since many commissioners came from bureaucratic backgrounds, this clause had practical significance for a large share of appointees.

The RTI (Amendment) Act, 2019: A turning point 🔗

The landscape shifted dramatically in July 2019. The Union Government introduced the RTI (Amendment) Bill, and despite vocal opposition from activists, former commissioners, and opposition parties, it was passed and received presidential assent. The amendment targeted three sections of the parent Act, including Section 16, which deals with the state-level commissions.

What changed in the law 🔗

The central change was conceptual: provisions that were previously written into the statute itself were moved into the domain of executive rule-making. According to an analysis by PRS Legislative Research, the amendment removed the statutory provisions on tenure, salaries, and terms of service, and authorised the Central Government to notify these through rules instead.

In practical terms, this meant three shifts:

The fixed five-year tenure was no longer guaranteed by law. The Central Government could now prescribe the duration of office. The salary parity with Election Commissioners and the state Chief Secretary was dropped. Pay and allowances would now be whatever the Centre decided. The pension deduction clause was also restructured, as the entire compensation scheme moved under the new rules.

The RTI Rules, 2019 🔗

On 24 October 2019, the government notified the Right to Information (Term of Office, Salaries, Allowances and Other Terms and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2019. These rules filled in the details that the amended Act had left open.

The rules fixed the tenure for the SCIC and SICs at three years, reduced from the earlier five years, while retaining the upper age limit of 65. The salary of the State Chief Information Commissioner was set at Rs 2.5 lakh per month, and that of a State Information Commissioner at Rs 2.25 lakh per month. The rules also retained the provision that reduces the salary of pension-receiving appointees by the pension amount, keeping that aspect of the original framework intact.

A notable feature of the rules is that they gave the Central Government discretion to decide any conditions of service not expressly covered, and its decision would be binding. The power to relax the rules also rested with the Centre, a point that has attracted its own criticism.

Why the change was justified and why it was criticised 🔗

Every major amendment invites debate, and this one was no exception. The arguments from both sides go to the heart of how we design institutions for democratic accountability.

The government’s reasoning 🔗

The Union Government’s defence was rooted in a distinction between constitutional and statutory bodies. The Minister in charge argued that the Election Commission is a constitutional body created under Article 324, responsible for conducting elections across the country, while the Information Commissions are statutory bodies created under the RTI Act.

Going by this logic, their service conditions should not be pegged to a constitutional office. Treating statutory and constitutional bodies as equivalents, the government argued, was an anomaly that needed correction. Separate rules would also allow the Centre to tailor the terms to the specific needs of Information Commissions.

The critics’ counter-argument 🔗

Critics, however, saw something very different. Commentary from the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative argued that the new structure concentrates power over information commissioners in the Central Government, even though states appoint their own SCICs and SICs. This creates what the piece describes as an anomalous situation where the state appoints the commissioner, but the Centre controls tenure and pay.

Three main concerns emerged from the public debate:

Loss of institutional independence: The original design used fixed tenure and high-status salaries as structural shields. Moving these to executive rules, critics argue, allows the government to influence commissioners indirectly, since their future service conditions can be altered by the same authorities whose orders they may need to review.

Reduced attractiveness of the office: By delinking the posts from Election Commissioner and Chief Secretary-level status, the amendment may discourage the most experienced and independent-minded candidates from accepting appointments. A shorter three-year term also reduces the scope for building institutional memory and expertise.

Impact on federalism: Since State Information Commissions serve state-level public authorities, giving the Central Government sole authority over their service conditions raises questions about the balance of power between the Centre and the states in the RTI architecture.

What it means for citizens using the RTI Act 🔗

For an ordinary citizen filing an RTI application, the mechanics of the appeals process have not changed. If a State Public Information Officer fails to respond or rejects an application unfairly, the citizen can still approach the First Appellate Authority, and then the State Information Commission as the final statutory recourse.

However, the effectiveness of that final recourse depends on how fearless and independent the commissioners are. An institution whose members serve for shorter, more uncertain terms, and whose salaries and allowances can be reconfigured by the executive, may behave more cautiously when deciding politically sensitive cases.

The ongoing challenges of vacancies, backlogs, and delays at many State Information Commissions compound these concerns. A commission that is both understaffed and structurally weaker risks becoming a paper tiger, which would undermine the very purpose for which the RTI Act was enacted.

Transitional protection for existing commissioners 🔗

One often-overlooked detail of the 2019 amendment is that it included a transitional protection. Commissioners appointed before the commencement of the RTI (Amendment) Act, 2019 were to continue to be governed by the provisions as they stood earlier. In other words, serving officers would retain their original five-year term and existing salary structure until their retirement or resignation. The new rules applied only to fresh appointments made after the amendment came into force.

This created a brief period of parallel regimes within the same commissions, where differently appointed members operated under different service conditions, a curiosity that highlighted just how significantly the amendment had altered the landscape.

What do you think? Does pegging the salaries of statutory bodies like Information Commissions to constitutional posts such as the Election Commission strengthen democratic accountability, or is it a conceptual confusion that needed correction? And if the goal of the RTI Act is to hold the government accountable, should the very government whose actions may be questioned have the power to decide the tenure and pay of those who adjudicate such questions?

References

1. https://www.aaptaxlaw.com/rti-act-2005/section-16-rti-act-2005-term-of-office-and-conditions-of-service-sec-16-of-right-to-information-act-2005.html
2. https://m.thewire.in/article/politics/centre-rti-act-information-commissioners-tenure-salary-retirement-benefits
3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right_to_Information_Act,_2005
4. https://prsindia.org/theprsblog/tenure-and-salaries-cic-and-ics-under-right-information-rules-2019?page=2&per-page=1
5. https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2019/10/25/right-to-information-term-of-office-salaries-allowances-and-other-terms-and-conditions-of-service-of-chief-information-commissioner-information-commissioners-in-the-central-information-commission/
6. https://cjp.org.in/supreme-court-frowns-upon-the-absolutely-inadequate-functioning-of-the-rti-machinery/
7. https://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/blog/central-governments-2019-rti-rules-making-a-mess-of-things-to-gain-a-stranglehold-on-information-commissions-after-misleading-parliament
8. https://www.nextias.com/blog/state-information-commission/