Reforming India’s Political Executive: Enhancing Integrity and Efficiency

India’s political executive sits at the heart of its democratic machinery, yet it is increasingly weighed down by corruption, criminalization, and inefficiency. From ministers facing serious criminal charges to legislators lacking the expertise to scrutinize complex policy, the challenges are stark. Reforming this institution is no longer an academic exercise but an urgent democratic necessity, one that requires a blend of legal, ethical, and managerial innovations to restore public trust and governance capacity.

The state of India’s political executive today 🔗

The political executive in India comprises the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister at the Union level, and Chief Ministers with their cabinets at the state level. These leaders are entrusted with policy formulation, legislative direction, and administrative oversight. However, the credibility of this tier has eroded over decades, and the evidence is difficult to ignore.

According to a 2025 analysis by the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), 45% of MLAs across 28 states and 3 Union Territories have declared criminal cases against themselves, and 29% face serious charges such as murder, attempted murder, kidnapping, and crimes against women. At the parliamentary level, the picture is similarly troubling, with a sharp rise in MPs declaring criminal antecedents over successive elections. In the 2019 Lok Sabha, 43% of elected members faced criminal charges, with 21% facing serious offences.

This data points to a systemic rot. When lawmakers themselves face allegations of grave wrongdoing, the laws they draft and the policies they supervise lose legitimacy. Reform, therefore, has to begin at the point of entry into the political executive.

Barring candidates with criminal backgrounds 🔗

One of the most debated reforms is the disqualification of candidates with serious criminal charges from contesting elections. Currently, under Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, disqualification kicks in only upon conviction, which, given the slow pace of trials, allows accused candidates to contest and win repeatedly.

The Law Commission’s 244th Report in 2014 had recommended disqualifying individuals against whom charges are framed at least one year before the scrutiny of nominations, for offences punishable with a sentence of five years or more. The Supreme Court has also nudged reform forward. In the landmark Lily Thomas v. Union of India ruling in 2013, the court disqualified lawmakers convicted of crimes from holding office, removing the earlier protection that allowed convicted legislators to continue pending appeal.

Why stronger legal barriers matter 🔗

Political parties continue to field candidates with criminal records because of their financial clout and electoral winnability. A cross-party consensus, fast-tracked trials through special courts, and even a possible lifetime ban for serious offenders have been suggested as the way forward. In a 2025 hearing, the Supreme Court sought responses from the Centre and the Election Commission regarding a possible lifetime ban on convicted individuals returning to Parliament. Without these legal barriers, money and muscle power will keep outpacing merit.

Educational qualifications for legislators 🔗

Another proposed reform is the introduction of minimum educational qualifications for legislators. Proponents argue that modern governance demands engagement with complex subjects such as fiscal policy, climate change, data regulation, and international trade. A basic level of formal education, they suggest, would help legislators read budget documents, question bureaucrats meaningfully, and frame better laws.

Critics caution that such a qualification could disenfranchise vast sections of society, particularly marginalized groups where formal education has historically lagged. They argue that wisdom, lived experience, and grassroots knowledge should not be dismissed simply because they do not come with a degree. The reform, therefore, needs careful balancing. One middle path is to make educational thresholds applicable only to specific executive roles, such as ministerial portfolios, rather than to election itself, combined with mandatory orientation and training programs.

Strengthening the anti-defection law 🔗

Political instability caused by legislators switching parties for personal gain has long plagued Indian democracy. The Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, inserted through the 52nd Amendment in 1985, was designed to curb this. It disqualifies legislators who voluntarily give up party membership or defy the party whip on key votes. The 91st Amendment of 2003 further strengthened the law by removing the split exception and barring defectors from ministerial office for a period.

Yet, defections continue through the merger loophole and through delayed decisions by Speakers. The Maharashtra political crisis of 2022 and the Goa defections earlier that year illustrate how the law’s spirit is routinely undermined.

What reforms can fix the gaps 🔗

The Law Commission and the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution have suggested that the decision on disqualification should be taken not by the Speaker but by the President or Governor on the advice of the Election Commission. This would remove the partisan pressure that presiding officers often face.

Other reforms include limiting the use of the whip to confidence and money bill votes only, enforcing a strict time limit for deciding disqualification petitions, and establishing an independent tribunal headed by a retired Supreme Court judge. [Image: A diagram showing the flow of anti-defection petitions from the Speaker to a proposed independent tribunal]

A parliamentary ombudsman and a code of ethics 🔗

Accountability needs dedicated institutional machinery. The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 created an anti-corruption ombudsman with jurisdiction over the Prime Minister, ministers, Members of Parliament, and central government officials. The Lokpal handles complaints of corruption against public functionaries and draws its legitimacy from India’s commitments under the UN Convention Against Corruption.

However, Lokpal’s early years have been modest. The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act received presidential assent on 1 January 2014 and was notified the same day, but the institution took years to become fully operational. Strengthening its investigative autonomy, ensuring timely appointments, and bringing all states’ Lokayuktas in line with the central Act are essential next steps.

Why a code of ethics matters 🔗

Beyond the criminal threshold, political executives also need an explicit code of ethics covering conflicts of interest, gift acceptance, asset disclosures, and conduct in office. While the Rajya Sabha adopted a code of conduct for its members in 2005, its enforcement has been weak. An enforceable code, monitored by a parliamentary ethics committee with real investigative powers, would help distinguish acceptable political behaviour from abuse of office.

Training in policy-making, management, and ICT 🔗

Legislators today deal with issues ranging from artificial intelligence regulation to climate finance. Without structured training, even well-intentioned representatives find it difficult to engage substantively with these subjects.

Several parliamentary democracies run formal induction and continuous learning programs for their legislators. In India, the Bureau of Parliamentary Studies and Training offers orientation, but the coverage remains limited. A more ambitious training architecture should include modules on:

Budget analysis and fiscal literacy, constitutional law and parliamentary procedure, data-driven policy-making, management of government programs, and Information and Communication Technology (ICT) tools that enable evidence-based decision-making and citizen engagement.

Equally important is the need to train ministers specifically on portfolio-related technical matters. A Health Minister who understands epidemiological modelling or a Finance Minister comfortable with macroeconomic data adds enormous value to governance.

Performance reviews and ministerial accountability 🔗

In most private sector organizations, performance is measured through clear, time-bound targets. The political executive, by contrast, has traditionally worked with vague mandates. Performance reviews for ministers, conducted by an independent body or by the Prime Minister’s Office with public disclosure, can transform this.

Parameters could include the pace of legislative commitments delivered, budget utilization, progress on flagship schemes, and responsiveness to parliamentary committees. Naturally, care must be taken so that such assessments do not degenerate into bureaucratic checkbox exercises that miss the qualitative substance of governance.

Linking reviews to outcome budgets 🔗

A powerful tool that dovetails with performance reviews is the outcome budget. Introduced in India in 2005-06 under the then Finance Minister, it shifts focus from financial allocations alone to the performance of ministries in achieving measurable development outcomes. In 2017, the government institutionalized this approach further through the Output-Outcome Monitoring Framework, which by 2021-22 covered 67 central ministries and more than 600 schemes involving roughly one-third of the government’s total schematic expenditure.

States such as Delhi, Assam, Odisha, and Haryana have adopted their own outcome budgeting systems. Delhi’s Outcome Budget links budgetary allocations to output and outcome indicators, with periodic ministerial reviews that help redesign schemes as needed. This approach gives citizens a clear understanding of what the government has promised and what it has delivered, creating pressure for honest performance.

Building the political will for reform 🔗

None of these reforms will happen automatically. Resistance from those benefiting from the status quo is real, and many reforms require constitutional amendments or new legislation. A phased approach works best: start with reforms that have judicial backing and civil society momentum, such as faster disposal of cases against lawmakers, stricter anti-defection enforcement, and full operationalization of Lokpal. Build coalitions across party lines on issues like legislator training and outcome budgeting, where there is less ideological disagreement.

Civil society, the media, and an engaged electorate remain the most important catalysts. Voter awareness campaigns that highlight candidates’ criminal records, think tanks that publish independent scorecards on ministerial performance, and journalists who follow up on unfulfilled promises together form the public accountability ecosystem that political reform ultimately depends on.

What do you think? Would requiring minimum educational qualifications for ministers strengthen governance or risk excluding grassroots voices from the political executive? And how can performance reviews for ministers be designed to measure real outcomes rather than becoming another bureaucratic ritual?

References

1. https://www.insightsonindia.com/2025/03/18/adr-report-on-criminalization-of-politics/
2. https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/criminalisation-of-politics-6
3. https://www.adrindia.org/content/article-19758-criminalization-of-politics-can-india-clean-up-its-politics-criminalization-corruption-and-reforms
4. https://adrindia.org/index.php/content/criminalization-of-politics-in-india-undermining-spirit-of-democracy
5. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-defection_law_(India)
6. https://prsindia.org/files/parliament/discussion_papers/The_Anti-Defection_Law.pdf
7. https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/anti-defection-law-11
8. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00195561231204936
9. https://lokpal.gov.in/pdfs/FreqAQs.pdf
10. https://www.business-standard.com/about/what-is-outcome-budget
11. https://swarajyamag.com/economics/the-outcome-budget-indias-silent-revolution-in-government-performance-management
12. https://ddc.delhi.gov.in/our-work/9/outcome-budget