Legislative Powers of State Governments in India

The Constitution of India does not simply hand over governing power to the Union and leave states to fend for themselves – nor does it create a loose arrangement where states act entirely on their own. Instead, it lays down a carefully designed framework that answers one fundamental question: who gets to make laws on what? The answer lies in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, which distributes legislative authority between the Union and the states through three distinct lists. Understanding this framework is essential for anyone who wants to grasp how state governments actually function within the larger federal structure.

The constitutional basis: Article 246 and the Seventh Schedule 🔗

The starting point is Article 246, which is the constitutional provision that formally assigns legislative powers based on the Seventh Schedule. Article 246 establishes a hierarchical structure among the three lists: Parliament has exclusive authority on Union List subjects, both Parliament and state legislatures can legislate on Concurrent List subjects, and state legislatures hold exclusive power over State List subjects. In cases of conflict between the lists, the order of priority runs from the Union List downward to the Concurrent List, and then to the State List.

The origins of this three-list model go back further than independence. The framework was drawn from the Government of India Act, 1935, which also divided legislative subjects into a Federal List, a Provincial List, and a Concurrent List. India’s framers adapted this colonial structure to suit a sovereign republic, expanding the Union List to safeguard national unity while preserving meaningful space for state autonomy through the State List.

The State List: where states hold exclusive ground 🔗

The State List is a list of 61 (originally 66) subjects in the Seventh Schedule over which the respective state governments have exclusive power to legislate. This list covers matters of local or regional importance – things that vary significantly from one part of the country to another and are best handled at the state level.

What does the State List contain? 🔗

State governments have the sole power to legislate on subjects such as law and order, public health and sanitation, local government, betting and gambling, and taxation on agricultural income, entertainment, and alcoholic beverages. Other important entries include police, land rights, agriculture, irrigation, markets and fairs, and roads other than national highways.

The State List is divided into two parts: a legislative or general section (entries 1 to 45) covering non-taxation matters, and a taxation section (entries 46 to 63) covering state-specific taxes. This internal structure ensures that states retain fiscal tools alongside their legislative mandate.

Why the State List matters for governance 🔗

The significance of the State List goes beyond a simple enumeration of subjects. State list subjects facilitate decentralisation, administrative effectiveness, and equality of governance throughout the nation by distributing powers between states and the Centre. When a state like Rajasthan legislates on water management differently from Kerala, or when Tamil Nadu frames its own policies on local bodies and markets, it is exercising this exclusive constitutional space.

However, the exclusivity of the State List is not absolute. Under specific constitutional conditions, Parliament can step in and legislate on State List subjects – a critical safeguard that the framers built into the system to prevent regional laws from conflicting with national priorities.

The Concurrent List: shared legislative space 🔗

The Concurrent List occupies a middle ground. The items on the Concurrent List include those on which both the Union government and state governments may legislate, though a Union law generally takes precedence; among these areas are criminal law, marriage and divorce, contracts, economic and social planning, population control and family planning, trade unions, social security, and education.

The Concurrent List currently contains 52 subjects (originally 47), and both the Centre and states can legislate on these. In the event of a conflict, Parliament’s law prevails – a rule laid down in Article 254 of the Constitution.

The 42nd Amendment and the shifting of subjects 🔗

The Concurrent List has not remained static. The 42nd Amendment Act of 1976 made significant changes by transferring several subjects from the State List to the Concurrent List, indicating a shift towards greater centralisation. Subjects like education and forests, which were once exclusively in the State List, were moved to the Concurrent List through this amendment, enabling Parliament to set national-level standards while still allowing states to legislate within that framework.

A more recent and far-reaching amendment was the 101st Amendment of 2016, which introduced the Goods and Services Tax (GST). The 101st Amendment reshaped India’s fiscal landscape through the introduction of GST, creating a new Article 246A that gives both Parliament and state legislatures concurrent power to levy GST – a significant departure from the earlier rigid separation of taxation powers.

When can Parliament override the State List? 🔗

The most important and nuanced aspect of this legislative framework is the set of constitutional provisions that allow Parliament to legislate on State List subjects in exceptional circumstances. These are not loopholes – they are deliberate safety valves designed to maintain national coherence. Articles 249, 250, 252, and 253 together provide constitutional flexibility while maintaining federal balance.

Article 249: national interest 🔗

This is one of the most significant exceptions. Under Article 249, if the Rajya Sabha declares by resolution supported by not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting that it is necessary or expedient in national interest for Parliament to make laws with respect to any matter in the State List, it shall be lawful for Parliament to make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India with respect to that matter while the resolution remains in force.

Such a resolution normally remains in force for one year and may be renewed for further periods of one year each. Laws made under this provision cease to have effect six months after the resolution ceases to operate. Importantly, this power is triggered through the Rajya Sabha – the Council of States – which gives the chamber representing state interests a direct role in authorising central intervention in state affairs.

Article 250: during a national emergency 🔗

Under Article 250, if a Proclamation of Emergency is in force, Parliament gains the power to make laws with respect to subjects in the State List. Such laws remain in force during the period of emergency and for six months beyond that. This provision ensures that governance remains coordinated and unified during crises that might otherwise fragment the national response.

Article 252: with state consent 🔗

Article 252 provides a mechanism for cooperative federal law-making, enabling Parliament to legislate on matters ordinarily within the exclusive domain of state legislatures when two or more states voluntarily agree to central legislation on specific State List subjects. Once enacted, such a law can be adopted by other states through a resolution of their own legislature. Crucially, only Parliament – not the state legislature – can later amend or repeal the law. This provision represents consensual delegation rather than coercive centralisation.

Article 253: international treaties 🔗

Article 253 empowers Parliament to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement, or convention with another country or any decision made at an international conference. Even if the subject matter of the treaty falls within the State List, Parliament can legislate on it to fulfil India’s international obligations. This ensures that India speaks with one voice in international forums and can honour its commitments without being blocked by the federal division of powers.

Resolving conflicts on the Concurrent List: Article 254 🔗

When both Parliament and a state legislature legislate on the same Concurrent List subject and the two laws come into conflict, Article 254 provides the constitutional resolution mechanism. Article 254(1) states that if any provision of a state law is repugnant to a parliamentary law on a matter in the Concurrent List, the parliamentary law shall prevail and the state law shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void.

However, there is an important exception. Where a state law on a Concurrent List matter contains provisions repugnant to an earlier parliamentary law, the state law shall prevail in that state if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent. Even so, Parliament retains the authority to subsequently enact a new law on the same subject, overriding the state law once again.

This interplay has played out in real legislative disputes. In the landmark case of State of West Bengal v. Union of India (2023), the Supreme Court struck down the West Bengal Housing Industry Regulation Act as unconstitutional because it was found to be extensively repugnant to the central Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016. The court applied the doctrine of repugnancy under Article 254, finding that both laws fell under the Concurrent List and that the state law extensively overlapped with the central legislation. This judgment illustrates that the doctrine is not merely textbook theory – it has practical consequences for how states exercise their legislative power.

Residuary powers: what falls outside all three lists? 🔗

The Seventh Schedule does not claim to cover every conceivable subject of legislation. New issues arise with changing technology and society. For these, the Constitution has a clear answer. The Constitution gives Parliament the exclusive power to make laws on subjects not covered in any of the three lists, known as residuary subjects. Examples include cyber laws, space exploration, digital currencies, and artificial intelligence. This arrangement ensures that the Centre has the authority to respond to emerging challenges even when the Constitution’s framers could not have anticipated them.

The balance between autonomy and oversight 🔗

What emerges from this entire architecture is a carefully calibrated system. States are not subordinate administrative units – they hold constitutionally guaranteed legislative authority over a wide range of subjects that directly affect daily life. At the same time, the Constitution does not treat state autonomy as absolute. The provisions enabling parliamentary intervention exist to prevent situations where state legislation, whether by design or default, undermines national unity, international obligations, or coordinated crisis response.

Laws made by state legislatures generally apply only within the territory of the state concerned, which means variations are likely to exist from state to state in provisions of law relating to matters falling in the State and Concurrent Lists. This diversity is not a weakness – it is a feature. It allows states to reflect the social, cultural, and economic realities of their populations in law, provided those laws do not conflict with the larger constitutional framework.

Over time, constitutional amendments have adjusted the balance. Subjects have moved between lists. New entries have been added. The GST reform fundamentally altered how taxation power is shared. But the basic tripartite structure has remained the foundation of Centre-state legislative relations since 1950, demonstrating its enduring relevance.

What do you think? 🔗

What do you think? The Seventh Schedule has been amended multiple times over the decades, and each change has tilted the balance between state autonomy and central authority in some way. Do you think the current distribution of subjects adequately reflects the principle of federalism, or has the gradual expansion of the Concurrent List given the Union too much leverage over what are nominally state subjects? And given that residuary powers rest exclusively with Parliament, how should the Constitution address entirely new domains – like artificial intelligence or data governance – where neither states nor the Centre has yet established a clear legislative framework?

References

1. https://www.sci.gov.in/constitution/
2. https://vajiramandravi.com/current-affairs/7th-schedule-of-indian-constitution/
3. https://tathastuics.com/article/indian-polity-seventh-schedule
4. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seventh_Schedule_to_the_Constitution_of_India
5. https://www.britannica.com/place/India/Constitutional-structure
6. https://testbook.com/ias-preparation/seventh-schedule-of-indian-constitution
7. https://drishticuet.com/current-affairs/schedule-vii
8. https://www.gktoday.in/article-249/
9. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1883579/
10. https://testbook.com/question-answer/under-which-article-of-the-indian-constitution-th–607a7a89d918a68a4ac2d093
11. https://www.gktoday.in/article-252/
12. https://www.lawjugaad.com/article-249-250-252-253-and-256-of-indian-constitution/
13. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1930681/
14. https://www.constitutionofindia.net/articles/article-254-inconsistency-between-laws-made-by-parliament-and-laws-made-by-the-legislatures-of-states/
15. https://testbook.com/constitutional-articles/article-254-of-indian-constitution